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Abstract
Legal interpreting is a highly specialized profession, not 
simply a function that any bilingual person can perform. 
Countries that have laws and regulations on court inter-
preting have them on the basis that everyone (includ-
ing linguistic minorities) has the right to due process. In 
South Africa legal interpreting takes place in a variety 
of state institutions and the Refugee Reception Offi  ces of 
the Department of Home aff airs is one such setting. Th e 
present study investigates legal interpreting at asylum 
determinations and hearings. Th e focus is on two stages of 
the asylum application, which are crucial for determining 
refugee status. Th is paper aims to explore the right of an 
asylum seeker to an interpreter at these stages of the status 
determination procedure. It will also compare this right to 
the existing right in international law and assess whether 
South Africa has met the minimum requirement to enable 
a due process.
Résumé
L’interprétation juridique est une profession hautement 
spécialisée, et non une simple fonction que toute personne 
bilingue peut eff ectuer. Les pays qui ont des lois et des 
règlements sur l’interprétation juridique les ont dévelop-
pés en raison d’une reconnaissance que tous (incluant les 
minorités linguistiques) ont droit à une procédure régu-
lière. En Afrique du Sud, l’interprétation juridique est pra-
tiquée dans une variété d’institutions d’État, et le Bureau 
de l’Accueil des Réfugiés du Département des Aff aires 
Intérieures en est un exemple. Cette étude examine en 
particulier la pratique de l’interprétation juridique lors 
des décisions et des audiences liées aux demandes d’asile. 
L’étude se concentre sur deux étapes de la demande d’asile, 
cruciales dans la détermination du statut de réfugié. Cet 
article explore le droit du demandeur d’asile à l’interpréta-
tion juridique durant ces deux étapes de la détermination 
de son statut. On y compare également ce droit aux droits 
existants dans le droit international, et évalue si l’Afrique 
du Sud rencontre les conditions minimales nécessaires à 
une procédure régulière.
Introduction
While court interpreting,1 oft en referred to as legal inter-
preting, is far from a new issue, it is true that it has become 
a more complex one. With at least a quarter million people 
from twenty diff erent countries entering South Africa annu-
ally for the purpose of seeking asylum2 and therefore neces-
sarily having to engage in a highly complex interaction with 
the government of South Africa at the Department of Home 
Aff airs to acquire a legal status, the need for interpreters has 
increased tenfold. Whether stemming from a deliberate 
disregard of this complex status determination process at 
the Department of Home Aff airs or from a failure to under-
stand it, many asylum seekers have had to engage South 
African courts as well. More attention therefore needs to be 
paid to the use of interpreters in all legal settings in South 
Africa and not only at the Department of Home Aff airs.
Many asylum seekers do not speak the language of the 
host country and as a result they depend on the skills of an 
interpreter. Th e question of what these skills should include, 
and the role the interpreter should play, is far from clear 
even beyond the Department of Home Aff airs or South 
Africa generally. It is also debated internationally, with aca-
demic scholars and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (hereinaft er the “UNHCR”) favouring a lib-
eral interpretation of the interpreter’s role, while the judi-
ciary, on the other hand, insisting on a restricted role.3 Th is 
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debate is based on the inherent problems which interpreta-
tion creates.
In 1952 Jean Herbert coined the phrase a ‘necessary 
evil’ for interpreters;4 the law has progressed since and this 
‘necessary evil’ has developed into a right. Interpretation is 
not an absolute right or a fundamental basic human right, 
but rather a procedural one that will be applied when ‘prac-
ticable and necessary.’5 Th e attitude to this right is obvious 
from its use and implementation; the research undertaken 
for the purposes of this paper refl ects that it is still largely 
viewed as a necessary evil.
Th is lack of enthusiasm around the use of interpret-
ers can be attributed to many factors, such as proceedings 
taking twice as long,6 the diffi  culty in making a credibility 
judgment if communication is not direct, the diffi  culty for 
the lawyers to cross-examine and discredit witness credibil-
ity,7 and the delay it causes when interpreters are not read-
ily available. However, the right to an interpreter cannot be 
ignored.
In 1929 the Irish Chief Justice in the case of Attorney—
General v Joyce and Walsh expressed the view that giving 
evidence in ones vernacular was a ‘requisite of natural jus-
tice, particularly in a criminal trial.’8 Waterhouse states that 
it is doubtful that the Chief Justice anticipated the increased 
number of non-native tongue speakers in the courts.9
Th is paper emphasises that this right is not the right 
to use the native tongue but rather as confi rmed in inter-
national case-law10 the right is a procedural one to under-
stand and participate in one’s own trial. Th e United Nations 
Human Rights Committee has been particularly adamant 
that the use of interpreters is unrelated to the issues of min-
ority language speakers.11 Th is is mainly the case with refu-
gee matters; refugees are not demanding that their language 
be recognised in their country of asylum, they merely want 
to be able to eff ectively communicate their refugee claim.
In the Canadian case of Andre Mercure v Attorney-
General12 the Court held that the right to be understood 
is not a language right but rather ‘one arising out of the 
requirements of due process.’
South African courts in terms of the Section Th irty-fi ve 
(three)(k) of the Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, have also had 
to consider the question of the use of the native tongue as 
a language right as opposed to a due process right.13 Th e 
paper aims to address two things: fi rstly, whether the right 
to an interpreter has been properly understood and imple-
mented by the Department of Home Aff airs as a procedural 
right and secondly, whether it has reached the minimum 
standard necessary to safeguard this procedural right. 
Qualitative research by the UCT Refugee Law Clinic was 
undertaken to understand how the Department of Home 
Aff airs is approaching this right. Recommendations will 
be made on how to safeguard this right by comparing it to 
other jurisdictions.
In the fi rst section this paper will undertake an analysis of 
the right to an interpreter as it appears in international law 
and in South African law. Furthermore, given the import-
ance of context a brief sketch of the Department of Home 
Aff airs’ asylum process and the various bodies responsible 
for determining refugee status in South Africa will be high-
lighted in section two. Section three discusses of the role 
of an interpreter, the competences, the necessity and the 
impact the lack of interpreters has on proceedings. Section 
four will conclude with an analysis of the research under-
taken and refl ect on the law and the role of the interpreter 
in South Africa and compare it to minimum standards set 
in other jurisdictions.
Overview and Analysis of International, Regional, 
and Domestic Legal Requirements of the Right to 
an Interpreter
An overview of the international, regional and domestic 
requirements of the right to an interpreter will be discussed 
in this section; and, more importantly, how this right can be 
extended to asylum proceedings.
Already in the sixteenth century, laws existed which 
regulated the judicial interpreting in the Spanish col-
onies.16 Similarly, Cassim states, that King Edward III 
instructed lawyers to use English in the courtroom to 
address the fact that ‘citizens had no knowledge of that 
which is said for them or against them.’15 In South Africa, 
the Magistrates Court Act Th irty-Two of 1944 at Section 
Six16 provides for the provision of an interpreter if, in the 
opinion of the Court, the accused is not suffi  ciently con-
versant in the language in which evidence is being given. 
Th e same provision prevails in the Supreme Court Act 
Fift y-nine of 1959.17 Th ough both the Magistrates Court 
and Supreme Court refer to interpreters in criminal mat-
ters only, it is apparent that the value and necessity of this 
has been recognised by the Department of Home Aff airs at 
asylum determinations and hearings. Th e right to an inter-
preter, although restricted to ‘where practicable and neces-
sary,’ is specifi cally referred to in the Refugees Act18 as well 
as in the Regulations19 to the Refugees Act. Th is paper will 
give an overview of the right to an interpreter in criminal 
proceedings and the reasoning behind this and argue that 
therefore the right to an interpreter should be extended to 
refugees at asylum hearings.
International Law
It is important to recognise that the right to an interpreter is 
an integral part of the right to a fair trial or hearing and that 
the right to a fair trial is a right recognised in international 
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human rights law documents outlined below, notwithstand-
ing the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (hereinaft er the “Refugee Convention”) 
and its 1967 Protocol.20
Th e 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees
Article Sixteen21 of the Refugee Convention specifi cally grants 
refugees and asylum seekers access to courts. Signifi cantly, no 
reservations to this article are permitted and all refugees are 
thus granted access to court notwithstanding the length of 
their stay in the country of asylum. According to Hathaway, 
although the Refugee Convention fails to eliminate many 
problems faced by refugees, the draft ers of the Convention 
have helped refugees overcome the practical impediments to 
accessing courts by assimilating them to the status of nation-
als.22 Th ey are aff orded the same treatment as nationals with 
regard to free access to courts, however, if the state lacks the 
resources and the judicial apparatuses to extend additional 
services such as legal aid and interpreting services to its own 
citizens, then it is not expected to extend it to refugees. Th e 
right to an interpreter is not expressly mentioned in the 1951 
Refugee Convention but can be inferred there from. Fair trial 
rights generally would include access to courts and broadly 
speaking, it would include the right to an interpreter, legal 
aid etc.
Th e right to an interpreter is however specifi cally men-
tioned in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and this paper contends that since refugee 
law is informed by international law, it should not be viewed 
as an isolated body of law and be denied the benefi ts there 
from.23
Th e International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)
Th e International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights24 
expressly guarantees the right to access the services of 
an interpreter at Article Fourteen (three)(f).25 It however 
restricts the right to an interpreter to an accused in a crim-
inal charge. Th e right to the free assistance of an inter-
preter where he or she does not understand the language 
of the court is guaranteed. It is mostly by virtue of Article 
Fourteen (three)(f) that the services of interpreters are pro-
vided for and used in several jurisdictions such as in the 
European Union.
It could be argued that this right is reserved for crim-
inal proceedings, however according to Laster and Taylor26 
a more general reading of the ICCPR suggests that it could 
be extended to civil proceedings. In the 1987 United 
Nations Human Rights Committee matter of S.W.M.Brooks 
v the Netherlands27 where Article Twenty-six28 was under 
discussion, Laster and Taylor argued that it is possible for 
the right to an interpreter to be extended to all types of mat-
ters to ensure “equal protection of the law.”
Th ey argue that if Article Twenty-six of the ICCPR 
stipulates a general principle of equality it could be used to 
extend the right to an interpreter to all types of matters to 
ensure fair treatment and to prevent a prejudicial outcome 
in any kind of matter. Th is basic acknowledgement of rights 
should extend to refugee determination proceedings as well.
European Convention on Human Rights
Th e right to an interpreter or translator during criminal 
proceedings is laid down in Article Six (three)(e) of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.29 Pursuant to this 
article every defendant has the right to free assistance of an 
interpreter, if he or she does not understand or speak the 
language of the court. Th ough South Africa is not bound by 
the European Convention of Human Rights, the precedents 
set at the European Court for Human Rights can have per-
suasive value in South African courts if a similar section or 
article is adjudicated upon.
According to the European Court of Human Rights there 
is no fair trial if no interpreter is provided. Th e decision in 
Kamasinski v Austria30 goes further by remarking on the 
quality of the interpreter to be provided. In Brozicek v Italy31 
the European Court of Human Rights indicated that the 
interpreting must be ‘adequate.’
Why Criminal Matters Only?
In most jurisdictions it is accepted that not only must inter-
preters be allowed at criminal trials but they have to be pro-
vided by the State because the consequences of not being 
heard are potentially very harmful. Th e result could be 
conviction of an innocent person or a criminal record that 
could result in very negative consequences for the accused. 
Th at logic needs to be extended to asylum hearings because 
the consequences could potentially be far more harmful; it 
could lead to persecution or risk to life upon return, the very 
reason why people seek asylum in the fi rst place.
Whether interpreters are allowed or not should as a “mat-
ter of common sense and common humanity depend on the 
gravity of the consequences.”32 Signifi cant fundamental 
human rights such as the right to life and liberty will be 
infringed if refugees are erroneously returned to their coun-
try of origin.
In addition, the cardinal principle in refugee law, the 
non-refoulement clause at Article Th irty-three33 is under 
attack as a result of a state practice that does not guarantee 
the use of an interpreter at refugee status determinations. 
Article Th irty-three of the Refugee Convention prohibits 
contracting states from returning refugees “in any manner 
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whatsoever,” to a country where their life or freedom would 
be threatened.34 Where interpreters are not provided or 
even where the competences of the interpreters are ques-
tionable refoulement takes place in a less direct form.
States are guilty of violating non-refoulement by not 
following fair administrative procedures, which would be 
the case if interpreters are not allowed or if incompetent 
interpreting occurs at asylum hearings or determinations. 
Th e consequences are therefore as harsh if not harsher 
than when the right to an interpreter is denied in criminal 
proceedings.
Th e South African Refugees Act and Refugees Act 
Regulations
Section Five (one) of the Regulations to the Refugees Act35 
130 of 1998 states that “ … [w]here practicable and necessary,” 
the Department of Home Aff airs will provide competent 
interpretation for the applicant at all stages of the asylum 
process. Research36 has revealed that many asylum seekers 
have been prejudiced in the past because the Department of 
Home Aff airs claimed that oft en it was not practicable for 
the Department to provide competent interpretation.
On the other hand, section Th irty-eight (one) (f) of the 
Refugees Act 130 of 1998 provides for the provision of inter-
preters at all levels of the asylum process. Th ere thus appears 
to be a confl ict between the Act itself and its Regulations that 
provide for interpreters only “where practicable and neces-
sary.” Th e usage of this phrase allows the Department of 
Home Aff airs to decide when it is practicable or necessary.
Th e terms “practicable and necessary” therefore need 
further analysis. When the applicant is unable to communi-
cate it is logically always “necessary” for the use of an inter-
preter. Without an interpreter it is obvious that no status 
determination interview can be properly conducted. Th is is 
typically the scenario at the Department of Home Aff airs 
with a large number of asylum seekers unable to speak 
English, the language offi  cially and exclusively used at the 
Department of Home Aff airs.
Th e Oxford dictionary defi nes practicable as “capable 
of putting into practice, with the available means.”37 Th e 
term “where practicable,” therefore allows for the shift ing 
of responsibility by the Department of Home Aff airs. Th e 
Department of Home Aff airs is under an obligation to 
provide only if it is possible for them. It may not be pos-
sible for many reasons, with lack of suffi  cient resources the 
most likely. Th e obligation in this instance is not just to hire 
interpreters, but to hire competent interpreters, and fi nding 
competent interpreters in such a range of languages is in 
itself challenging.
Kerfoot and de La Hunt38 briefl y outlined the pre-2010 
practice at the Department of Home Aff airs’ Refugee 
Reception Offi  ces where the burden was placed on the refu-
gees to provide an interpreter; the Department thus evad-
ing its obligation. Th ey refer to interpreters working free-
lance at the Refugee Reception Offi  ces and the practice of 
asylum seekers bringing their own interpreters who usually 
required payment. Th ere was clearly no recruitment policy 
and no method to test competency; the ad-hoc manner in 
which the interpreting occurred did not guarantee a fair 
administrative procedure at all.
Th e current research reveals that the above procedure 
as outlined by Kerfoot and de la Hunt has changed at the 
Department of Home Aff airs. Th e Department now pro-
vides interpreters, but these interpreters are not employed 
by the Department, they are employed by a non-govern-
ment organisation called Refugee Ministries and placed at 
the Refugee Reception Offi  ces.
South African Case-Law and the Constitution
Th e terms “where practicable and necessary” are analyzed 
in various South African High Court judgments however 
bearing in mind that these judgments refer to indigenous 
languages which in terms of the Constitution39 must be 
protected and their use promoted. Much of the case-law on 
the right to an interpreter in South Africa has developed 
through the criminal law.
In the case of Mthetwa v De Bruin and Another,40 the 
appellant argued that he did not understand the language 
of the court suffi  ciently, being a native isiZulu speaker. It 
was ruled that because he spoke enough English and that 
the court staff  and judiciary did not speak the isiZulu at all, 
it was impractical to conduct the court in isiZulu. Th e court 
stated that the Constitutional provision is clear, that is, if it 
is not practicable to use the language in court, the proceed-
ings must be interpreted in that language. Th e usage of the 
word practicable gives the court power to determine when 
it is feasible or not to conduct the hearing in the language 
choice of the appellant.
If that reasoning is extended to provision of interpreters, 
that is, the Department of Home Aff airs will only provide 
interpreters if feasible, it leaves the asylum seeker extremely 
vulnerable. Th e asylum seekers will have to source their 
own interpreters, increasing their vulnerability and expos-
ing them to exploitation.41
Asylum seekers are not demanding that matters be heard 
in the language of their choice; the purpose of the use of 
any language with regard to status determinations of asy-
lum seekers is simply to ensure eff ective communication; 
therefore it is more akin to a fair trial right as at section 
Th irty-fi ve (three)(k) of the Constitution42 which provides 
that “every accused has a right to a fair trial, which includes 
the right to be tried in a language that the accused person 
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understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the pro-
ceedings interpreted in that language.”
Recently, however the High Court43 substituted its deci-
sion for that of the Refugee Status Determination offi  cer 
because fair procedure, which included the right to an inter-
preter, had been violated.
Th e Asylum Process in South Africa
Th e use of interpreters to access justice in South Africa, a 
country with eleven offi  cial languages, is not an uncom-
mon or unexplored phenomenon. In South Africa legal 
interpreting takes place in a variety of state institutions. 
Th e Refugee Reception Offi  ces of the Department of Home 
Aff airs is one such setting. Th e present study investigates 
legal interpreting at asylum determinations and hearings. 
Th e focus is on two levels of the asylum application, which 
are crucial for determining refugee status.
Several interactions with the Department of Home 
Aff airs are required before refugee status is granted or 
denied. It is during these interactions that interpreters are 
required but are not necessarily provided, or those provided 
are untrained. Th e procedure for applying for refugee status 
in South Africa in accordance with the rules and regula-
tions of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 is undeniably a com-
plicated legal procedure. Interpreters must therefore have 
a linguistic understanding of the complex legal concepts 
within refugee status determination such as alienage, non-
refoulement, persecution as opposed to prosecution, and 
state responsibility, for the interpretation to be eff ective.
Given the importance of context the paper will provide 
a brief sketch of the asylum process including all the inter-
actions with the Department of Home Aff airs and the vari-
ous bodies responsible for determining refugee status in 
South Africa.
Th e Right to Seek Asylum
Th e right to seek asylum is enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights44 and regulated under the 
1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. According 
to these documents refugee status is to be granted to anyone 
who has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself 
to the protection of that country.”45
South Africa has incorporated the 1951 Refugee 
Convention defi nition as well as the defi nition in the 
Convention Governing the Specifi c Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa,46 (hereinaft er the OAU Convention) 
into its national law at Section Th ree of the Refugees Act, 
as follows:
A person qualifi es for refugee status for the purposes of this Act 
if that person-
(a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason 
of his or her race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of 
his or her nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of that country, or, not having a nation-
ality and being outside the country of his or her former habitual 
residence is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to 
it; or
(b) owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domina-
tion or events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in 
either a part or the whole of his or her country of origin or nation-
ality, is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in 
order to seek refuge elsewhere; or
(c) Is a dependant of a person contemplated in paragraph (a) or 
(b).
Th e determination of refugee status in terms of the above 
defi nition is a highly complex legal determination and spe-
cial structures are needed for this determination. Concepts 
such as “persecution,” “well-founded-fear,” and “member-
ship of a particular social group,” within this defi nition, 
require a legal interpretation. Despite the fact that consist-
ent eff orts at establishing standard practices for refugee 
status determinations are made by UNHCR,47 it is up to 
the individual signatory states to create a legal framework 
and institutional structures and procedures for conducting 
refugee status determinations under national law.
In terms of its national laws, South Africa has set up such 
a determination procedure. It is a two-tier procedure as is 
generally found elsewhere and also typical of most legal 
processes, a fi rst instance determination and an appeal 
hearing if necessary.
Refugee Reception in South Africa
Th e fi rst step in the asylum process is for the asylum seek-
ers to lodge an application in person at one of the Refugee 
Reception Offi  ces of the Department of Home Aff airs. Th is 
is done in terms of Section Twenty-one of the Refugees 
Act, which states that the application for asylum “must be 
made in person.” Th e application requires the completion 
of a nine-page eligibility determination form referred to 
as the BI-1590.48 Th is form is exclusively in English and it 
includes questions with regard to the applicant’s personal 
details, country background and reasons for applying 
for asylum. Th is form is issued to asylum seekers on the 
day that they apply for asylum and it must be completed 
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on the Department of Home Aff airs premises on that day. 
Applicants with no knowledge of English are therefore 
unable to complete the application form without the help of 
an interpreter. Not only must the reception offi  cer receive 
this form from the applicant, the reception offi  cer is under 
an obligation, in terms of the regulations49 to assist where 
necessary to ensure the proper completion thereof. At the 
end of this procedure asylum seekers are issued with a sec-
tion Twenty-two temporary asylum permit. Th e issuance 
of this temporary asylum permit is obligatory; the refugee 
reception offi  cer has no discretion. Th is fi rst step in the 
application process is however very important as it is oft en 
used as the basis of the claim at the later determination stage, 
even if proper assistance was not provided at this initial 
stage. Countless times the Refugee Appeal Board50 and the 
Standing Committee of Refugee Aff airs51 have also made 
credibility fi ndings against asylum seekers on the basis of 
lack of consistency between fi rst and later interviews.
Refugee Status Determination
Following the issuance of the asylum seeker permit aft er 
the applicant completes the BI-1590 form, the asylum 
seeker must have a status determination interview with a 
Refugee Status Determination Offi  cer. Th e Refugee Status 
Determination Offi  cer is empowered in terms of section 
Twenty-four (three) of the Refugees Act to make a deci-
sion with regard to the status of the applicant. Th e appli-
cant may be granted status or may be denied status with the 
right to appeal the decision at the Refugee Appeal Board. 
Th e applicant may also be rejected as manifestly unfounded 
with the right to have the decision reviewed by the Standing 
Committee for Refugee Aff airs.
Th e Refugee Status Determination Offi  cer, when consid-
ering the application must have due regard for the rights 
set out in section Th irty-three52 of the Constitution and in 
particular ensure that the applicant fully understands the 
procedures, his or her rights and responsibilities, and the 
evidence presented.
Th e Refugees Act Regulations refer to the inter-
action between the asylum seeker and Refugee Status 
Determination Offi  cer as a non-adversarial interview. Th e 
Refugee Status Determination Offi  cer conducts the hearing 
“to elicit information bearing on the applicant’s eligibility for 
refugee status.”53
Hence, the Refugee Status Determination Offi  cer must 
be able to communicate with the applicant and again where 
the Refugee Status Determination Offi  cer is unable to com-
municate with the asylum seeker, the use of an interpreter 
is necessary. Th e research conducted for this paper has 
refl ected a number of irregularities at this stage, which will 
be highlighted and discussed later.
In addition to the interview that must necessarily be done 
via an interpreter, it becomes compulsory for the Refugee 
Status Determination Offi  cer to explain the procedure once 
rejected whether as manifestly unfounded or unfounded.
Appeal and Review
Th e review by the Standing Committee of Refugee Aff airs 
and the appeal by the Refugee Appeal Board are the fi nal 
stages of the determination in terms of the Refugees Act. 
It is particularly at the appeal stage, where legal counsel is 
allowed to represent appellants, that interpretation is one of 
the aspects scrutinised. In the author’s experience the dis-
crepancies between the BI-1590 and the interview with the 
Refugee Status Determination Offi  cer largely occur as a result 
of inadequate interpretation. Oft en these discrepancies are 
remedied at the appeal stage as recognised in the unreported 
case of Van Garderen v Refugee Appeal Board.54
Inadequate interpretation has also been used as a basis 
for review in the High Court in the Matter of Deo Gracias 
Katshingu55 where the applicant stated that the Refugee 
Status Determination Offi  cer failed to provide competent 
interpretation in circumstances where it was plain that this 
was necessary. Bozalek J held that:
… the applicant did not enjoy the hearing he was entitled to 
in terms of the relevant provisions of the Refugees Act, the 
Regulations framed pursuant thereto and the provisions of the 
Constitution. Th e most egregious shortcoming in this regard, was 
the second respondent’s failure to provide an interpreter compe-
tent in English and French, in the absence of which no hearing or 
process, it seems to me, could have taken place.56
Th e Interpreter’s Role, Competences, and 
Qualifi cations
Legal interpreting is a highly specialised profession57, and 
not simply a function that any bilingual person can per-
form. Countries that have laws and regulations on court 
interpreting have them on the basis that everyone, includ-
ing linguistic minorities, has the right to due process.
Waterhouse, following a literature review, lists the neces-
sary skills of interpreters as those including “linguistic 
ability, memory, sensitivity, ability to build rapport and 
inspire confi dence, objectivity, diplomacy, patience, toler-
ance, cultural, social and political awareness, the ability to 
listen, analyse and repeat a message, good hearing and clear 
speaking, physical stamina and strong nerves as some of the 
many qualities needed to be a competent interpreter.”58
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Competency
As stated by Judge Bozalek in the matter of Deo Gracias 
Katshingu59 competent interpreters are necessary, not only 
so that applicants can state their claim, but also to safeguard 
procedural rights.
Regulation Five of the Refugees Act states that the “inter-
preter must be competent to translate a language spoken 
and understood by the applicant, to a language spoken and 
understood by the Refugee Reception Offi  cer or Refugee 
Status Determination Offi  cer.”60 Th e Regulation however 
fails to address the manner in which competency could be 
measured and there is not a mechanism to address the issue 
of incompetent interpreters.
Addressing the competency of interpreters has, however 
been accomplished eff ectively in other jurisdictions. For 
example, Holland’s Sworn Translators and Interprets Act61 
that came into operation on the fi rst of January, 2009, states 
the necessary competences for interpreters. Firstly, this Act 
established a Quality Institute, which advised on the neces-
sary competences. Secondly, it listed the actual competences 
that the interpreter should have such as: at least a secondary 
education in the language and be a native speaker, a certifi -
cate or a sub-certifi cate for an interpreter, and course work 
experience in the region of the foreign language for the per-
son involved.
Similarly the European Union has devised a framework 
on the right to interpretation62 by adopting common min-
imum procedural standards. Article Six of this framework 
allows for interpretation to be free of charge in criminal 
proceedings when the suspect does not understand the lan-
guage of the court. Th is right extends throughout the pro-
ceedings. At Article Eight member states are expected to 
ensure suffi  ciently qualifi ed interpreters to provide accur-
ate interpretation. If this fails there should be a mechan-
ism in place to replace the interpreter. At Article Nine the 
Framework states that proceedings should be recorded to 
facilitate verifying the accuracy of the interpretation.
Role and Function of the Interpreter
Th e role of the interpreter has been extensively examined by 
academics, with Mickelsohn63 asking whether interpreters 
should be “invisible, neutral, participative, active, a mem-
ber of the investigating team or team with the applicant?” 
Granger and Baker64 have found evidence of role confl icts 
amongst interpreters themselves in their study. According 
to these authors, while most interpreters considered dir-
ect language translation their primary goal, in practice the 
study revealed that interpreters have found themselves in 
situations that required careful balancing. Some interpret-
ers considered it part of their job to be a “cultural broker, 
technical explainer and advocate.”65
Berk-Seligson’s66 study on court interpreting began with 
the premise that “interpreters should be physically invis-
ible and vocally silent.” In fact, she found that the impact 
of interpreters on legal proceedings was far greater than 
had been imagined. Interpreters can manipulate language 
to shift  blame and structures and aff ect sympathy, and 
change speech style in terms of politeness, formality and 
verbally more active than realised which strongly aff ects 
the court’s power relations.67 Th e research undertaken at 
the Department of Home Aff airs by the Refugee Law Clinic 
corroborates these fi ndings of Berk-Seligson.
According to Steytler, an interpreter’s function is 
unambiguous: “to translate accurately, comprehensively, 
and without bias, all communications in court to a lan-
guage in which the accused can understand.”68 Th e role 
of the interpreter is thus to facilitate the communication 
where one party is not conversant in the court language. He 
or she should deliver an expert service and assume a neutral 
position in the context between the parties.
Channon, states that “a good court interpreter must have 
the ability to translate faithfully without adding to the ques-
tions asked or the answers given.”69 He also notes that the 
interpreter must be “completely impartial and take no per-
sonal interest in the outcome of the case” and the interpreter 
must “remain unaff ected by anything he sees or hears.”70 
Th is approach has been adopted by the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal in the United Kingdom in the matter 
of AA and the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
where the Adjudicator held that “ … it was in the highest 
degree undesirable for the interpreters as Court offi  cial to 
be asked to contribute in any way to the determination of 
a contested issue. In his task of comprehension and com-
munication, the interpreter needs to have and maintain the 
confi dence of all those with whom he deals, including the 
witness evidence whose is being interpreted, the representa-
tives of both parties and the judge.”71
Th e authors cited above (Berk-Seligson, Channon, and 
Steytler) have all illustrated how important interpreters 
are in guaranteeing one’s right to due process by ensuring 
one’s ‘presence’ in court. Th is notion of linguistic presence 
(i.e. the defendant cannot be present at his/her trial if he/she 
does not understand the language of the proceedings) was 
established in the 1974 matter of Arizona vs Natividada.72
Type of Interpreter: Legal Interpreters, Community 
Interpreters or Active Intermediaries?
Fenton sees the debate surrounding the rights and obliga-
tions of community interpreters as a concurrence of two 
positions: interpreting and advocacy. According to her, 
interpreting means a “close rendition of what is heard with 
cultural adjustments strictly limited to linguistic elements, 
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while advocacy includes interventions by the interpreter 
on behalf of the clients and for their perceived benefi ts.”73 
Legal interpreters have set themselves apart from commun-
ity interpreters with their own set of professional principles.
Barsky pleads for the role of the interpreters in asylum 
matters to be extended to one of an active intermediary.74 
He proposes strategies ranging from intervening with ques-
tions and clarifi cations to adding unsolicited supplementary 
information on the historical political and social situation of 
the claimant’s country. Barsky is clearly arguing to use the 
interpreter to compensate for inadequate status determina-
tion techniques. Th e research conducted for the purposes of 
this paper reveals that even though interpreters are aware 
of how the incompetence of Refugee Status Determination 
Offi  cers fails claimants they nevertheless report in trying as 
far as possible not to play this extended role. Asylum claim-
ants have been unable to comment on whether interpreters 
played a more active role than they ought to.
Measurement Standards and Research Conducted
It has been highlighted above that the right to an interpreter 
is essentially a procedural right that derives from the right 
to a fair trial. Th e aim of the research conducted for this 
paper was to establish whether the procedural right has 
been adequately extended to refugees and asylum seekers 
in South Africa and thereaft er to measure whether this 
right has been fairly applied at all stages of the status deter-
mination process by comparing it to minimum standards as 
identifi ed in other jurisdictions.
Establishing the appropriate criteria for interpreting pro-
fi ciency is a diffi  cult task; however this has been done in a 
number of jurisdictions in Europe and in the United States 
of America. Th ese countries have given eff ect to legislative 
provisions, which state that competent interpreters should 
be provided, by adopting certifi cation programs to ensure 
that interpreters used in courts and tribunals are qualifi ed. 
Th e Holland Sworn Translators Act, the European Union 
framework and the Federal Courts Act of 1978 75 in the 
United States are all examples of programs adopted to estab-
lish measurable criteria for qualifi cations and competency. 
According to Mikkelson, it is evident that these programs 
were developed because where interpreters were used on an 
ad hoc basis, the consequences were disastrous.76
Research Statistics and Analysis
Th e University of Cape Town Refugee Law Clinic has been 
representing large numbers of rejected asylum seekers 
before the Refugee Appeal Board and before the Standing 
Committee of Refugee Aff airs over the past fi ft een years.77 
Th e Refugee Law Clinic is oft en informed by rejected asylum 
seekers that they were rejected because they were not able 
to relate their claims eff ectively because of language con-
straints or because interpreters put words in their mouths 
or signifi cantly fi ltered what they said. Th us rejected asylum 
seekers are claiming that ineff ective interpretation has been 
a cause in their rejection.
Rejected asylum seekers and interpreters have been 
interviewed to ascertain whether lack of proper interpreta-
tion could have been a factor in their rejection both at the 
initial stages by the Refugee Status Determination Offi  cers, 
and at the fi nal review or appeal stage before the two quasi-
judicial bodies.
Interviews with Asylum Seekers
Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with asylum seekers covering topics including: their experi-
ence of the status determination process at the Department 
of Home Aff airs’ Refugee Reception Offi  ces; their expecta-
tions of the interpreters; whether they understood the 
processes through which they were taken; whether they 
thought they were treated fairly; the problems they faced; 
and, whether it was dealt with to their satisfaction.
Interviews were conducted with a total of 124 rejected 
asylum seekers from the twenty-sixth of September 2011 
until the fourteenth of December 2011. All of these asylum 
seekers were assisted to lodge an appeal with the Refugee 
Appeal Board. Lodging an appeal necessitates the comple-
tion of an appeal affi  davit in terms of rule four (two) of the 
Amended Refugee Appeal Board Rules.78 Of the 124 rejected 
asylum seekers assisted, it was established that eighty-six 
asylum seekers needed the assistance of an interpreter at 
the application stage as well as at the determination stage. It 
was also established that interpreters were provided by the 
Department of Home Aff airs at both these stages; to assist 
with the BI-1590 form (mentioned above) as well as at the 
status determination interview, and in most cases it was the 
same interpreter. Th e author asserts that having the same 
interpreter at both stages in itself became problematic as the 
interpreter did not have a clear understanding of his or her 
role. A further factor was the evident inadequate interview 
skills of the Refugee Status Determination Offi  cers.
Th e overview provided is based on the eighty-six asylum 
seekers that needed the assistance of an interpreter. It is 
apparent from this statistic that a very large percentage of 
asylum seekers need the assistance of an interpreter and 
it is clear that the Refugee Reception Offi  ce will not be 
able to function without the assistance of interpreters. Th e 
research established that interpreters were provided by the 
Department of Home Aff airs for all asylum seekers who 
needed assistance at all stages of the status determination. 
Not a single applicant interviewed was allowed to bring 
their own interpreter; in one instance a minor was forced 
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to use the services of the interpreter provided by Home 
Aff airs and the family member was not even allowed to be 
present.
Th e asylum seekers who were interviewed believed the 
interpreters to be employed by Department of Home Aff airs. 
All asylum seekers were pleased and relieved to have some-
one present that could understand them and assist them to 
communicate with the Department of Home Aff airs. Not a 
single asylum seeker even in direct response to the question 
“did you trust the interpreter?” responded by saying that they 
did not. Generally, the interpreters provided were viewed in 
a positive light and it is evident that the asylum seekers felt 
a kinship with the interpreters; interestingly, they seemed 
to view the interpreters as community interpreters rather 
than professionals; meaning they believed the interpreters 
to be present for their assistance rather than for the benefi t 
of status determination process.
It was only upon more in-depth questioning about the 
role of the interpreter and the competences of the inter-
preter that the asylum seekers started to focus on areas of the 
interpretation that were not necessarily to their benefi t. For 
example, not all interpreters spoke the preferred languages 
of the asylum seekers. Some of the asylum seekers would 
have preferred to speak, for example, Lingala, a language 
generally spoken in the western part of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) but were forced to speak Swahili, 
a language from the eastern part of the DRC, because the 
interpreter present could not speak Lingala. Th is would not 
be refl ected on the decision yet it is clearly a procedural ele-
ment of the interview that may aff ect the outcome. Rwandan 
asylum seekers similarly were assisted by Burundian inter-
preters and though they could largely communicate with 
the Burundian interpreter they upon refl ection highlighted 
the fact that the Burundian interpreter failed to pick up on 
the diff erent nuances in the languages.
Upon being interviewed, many asylum seekers were sur-
prised to learn that what they told the interpreter was not 
refl ected in its entirety in the written decision of the status 
determination offi  cer. Many found that only a fraction of 
what they said was refl ected in the decision. One asylum 
seeker remarked that he told a lengthy story to the Refugee 
Status Determination Offi  cer and the interpreter only said a 
few words. He refl ected upon questioning by the researcher 
that at the time he did not do or say anything; it was only 
when the lack of information or the minimum informa-
tion was brought to his attention by the researcher that he 
realised that the interpreter was not as competent and as 
helpful as he initially thought.
Some asylum seekers were surprised to fi nd that the 
decisions of the status determination offi  cer refl ected a 
completely contrary account of their asylum claim to what 
they told the interpreter and the status determination offi  -
cer. Asylum seekers failed to understand the irregularities 
as refl ected in their decisions. Th is is not an unexpected 
phenomenon. Abuya79 refers to the omniscient interpreter 
(those who put words in the mouths of the applicants) and 
the distortional interpreter (those who misconstrue state-
ments made by claimants).
All asylum seekers signed the BI-1590 document, which 
was fi lled in with the assistance of an interpreter and took 
receipt of the status determination offi  cer‘s decision by sign-
ing the decision, without being aware of what they signed. 
Asylum seekers had no way of verifying their version of 
what was said at the hearing.
It is clear from the above that safeguards need to be put 
in place if fair procedure is to be guaranteed.
Interviews with Interpreters
Various open-ended interviews were conducted with 
interpreters for asylum seekers and refugees based at the 
Department of Home Aff airs Refugee Reception Offi  ce in 
Cape Town in an attempt to establish their profi ciency, their 
competences, the manner in which they viewed themselves, 
how they were viewed by the Department of Home Aff airs 
and by the asylum seekers as interpreters.
Th e offi  cial language at the Department of Home Aff airs 
Refugee Reception offi  ce in Cape Town is English according 
to all the interpreters and the asylum seekers. In the auth-
or’s experience as a practicing refugee attorney for the past 
nine years it is evident that the offi  cials at the Department of 
Home Aff airs Refugee Reception Offi  ce communicate only 
in English to all refugees and asylum seekers. Th is means 
that the interpreter must be able to speak English and at 
least one other language. Oft en however interpreters were 
roped in to extend their services in their second or third 
language. For example, the Somali interpreter interviewed 
attested to being used as an Arabic interpreter (though 
Arabic is his second language); he was also asked to inter-
pret in Swahili even though it is a language he learnt while 
travelling through Kenya and Tanzania.
Bearing in mind the competences set out in the Holland 
Sworn Interpreters and Translators Act and other Acts 
detailed above, interpreters were asked questions to assess 
their competences. Th ey were also asked questions with 
regard to their role perception and their feelings toward 
their job.
Th e Level of Education
All the interpreters interviewed had a tertiary education in 
their fi rst language and at least a secondary education in 
English. Some of them had tertiary education in English, 
one of them with an Honours degree in English and French 
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and an Honours degree in Linguistics obtained in South 
Africa.
Th e qualifi cations of all interpreters were verifi ed through 
the South African Qualifi cations Authority.80 Th ough it is 
apparent that a minimum education standard has been set 
for the hiring of interpreters none of the interpreters have 
any specifi c training in interpretation.
Job Opportunity
Some of the interpreters interviewed have been interpreting 
for asylum seekers at the Department of Home Aff airs since 
2008 on an ad hoc basis as outlined by Kerfoot and de la 
Hunt above. Many changes in the hiring of and expecta-
tions have occurred in the past four years with some of the 
most signifi cant changes taking place during 2011. Most of 
these earlier positions were voluntary in the sense that the 
interpreters were not offi  cially employed by the Department 
of Home Aff airs or any other agency. Th e Department of 
Home Aff airs realizing that it would be impossible for them 
to operate without interpreters allowed interpreters on 
their premises to interact with and assist refugees. Any fees 
earned were as a result of the interpreters own negotiations 
with the applicants. Despite the fact that it was a voluntary 
position at the time, the Department of Home Aff airs never-
theless expected the interpreters to submit their curriculum 
vitae, which were scrutinised by the Department offi  cials. 
Th ey were also received by the Department of Home Aff airs 
and the expectations of the Department were outlined in 
the initial meeting.
Th e research reveals interpreters are no longer used on 
an ad hoc basis; interpreters are in formal employment 
and refugees and asylum seekers are no longer required 
to bring their own interpreters or pay interpreters. Th ere 
is an attempt to bring procedures in line with the law, for 
instance the nine-page BI-1590 eligibility form is now com-
pleted with the assistance of the refugee reception offi  cer81 
and an interpreter.
Role Perception of the Interpreter
Th e interpreters interviewed were ambiguous about their 
role, claiming to be both a neutral interpreter as well as a 
person with strong attachment to the claimants for whom 
they felt pity and sympathy. Th is ambiguity in the auth-
or’s opinion is as a direct result of lack of professionalism 
and training on the part of the interpreters. Most of the 
interpreters have felt that it is easy to remain neutral and 
translate directly if the interviewer is fair and competent 
and where claimants are easily able to answer the questions 
posed to them by the interviewer. Interpreters have stated 
that it became diffi  cult to remain neutral where interview-
ers have been deliberately misleading and disrespectful to 
claimants and where claimants were obviously lying. A case 
in point would be where interviewers have clearly failed 
to ask someone from a war torn region about the war but 
instead asked whether they came to South Africa to seek 
employment or where a claimant alleged that he or she was 
from a war-torn area and it was obvious to the interpreter 
that they were not.
Th e research has thus revealed the necessity for a formal 
approach to interpreting and for a defi nite increasing of 
standards and awareness creation in this regard.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Th e brief research undertaken reveals that interpreters 
have not received any training by the Department of Home 
Aff airs. Th e only qualifi cation expected of the interpret-
ers is that they are adequately literate in the language they 
interpreter into and from. Th is is by no means comparable 
to any recognised skills of interpreters as set out in other 
jurisdictions.
Th e meager attempt made by the Department of Home 
Aff airs simply to have interpreters present at hearings does 
not in any way guarantee the right to a fair procedure as out-
lined in the Constitution and the Refugees Act. No attempts 
are made to ensure the competences of the interpreters and 
neither is there a procedure to remedy the situation if the 
interpreter is obviously incompetent.
Th e Department of Home Aff airs must set the stage for 
refugees to be able to eff ectively communicate their claim, 
failure thereof, is highly prejudicial as well as unlawful.
Neither the Department of Home Aff airs nor the South 
African courts have set minimum standards for compe-
tent and trained interpreters. With so many individuals, 
not only nationals due to South Africa’s eleven offi  cially 
recognised languages, but also the increasing number of 
asylum seekers unable to communicate in South Africa’s 
offi  cial languages, the need for the setting and implementa-
tion of these standards are overdue. Minimum standards 
and rules and ethics with regard to interpreting must be 
formalised as a matter of urgency in South Africa and in 
particular at the Department of Home Aff airs.
In South Africa various academics and other inter-
ested parties have lobbied for and even established Court 
Interpreting programs, not only to provide better services but 
also to raise the profi le and status of interpreters.82 In South 
Africa various degree and diploma courses83 are off ered by 
universities but such qualifi cations are not demanded by the 
Courts in South Africa for interpreters.84
In the United States certifi cation programs were 
adopted to ensure that the interpreters working in the 
courts are qualifi ed. Th e fi rst such program was instituted 
under the Federal Courts Acts of 1978. Mikkelson85 made 
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recommendations for the European Court for Interpreters 
on the basis of experiences of colleagues in the United 
States. She noted that these programs in the United States 
ran into immediate problems because of the low pass rate. 
South Africa should bear this in mind and not impose test-
ing on interpreters already working in the system without 
any training.
In conclusion, having noted minimum standards in 
other jurisdictions it is recommended that for South Africa 
to ensure competent interpretation in the asylum process as 
well as the courts, it must undertake the following:
• Develop training programs, that is, provide such train-
ing for existing interpreters as well as aspiring inter-
preters. Such training should necessarily include 
formal interpreting skills as well as knowledge of the 
law and ethics with regard to interpreting. Aspirant 
interpreters should only be admitted to the training 
programs once profi ciency in the languages they are 
interpreting into and from have been established.
• Ensure that formalized testing and certifi cations take 
place aft er the training, conducted by individuals who 
are trained in language and interpreting techniques.
• Practice materials should be developed.
• Seminars to acquaint Refugee Status Determination 
Offi  cers, presiding offi  cers and other court staff  with 
the nature of interpreting must be organised and 
attendance should be compulsory.
• Th e interpreters must have qualifi cations with regards 
to the language they are interpreting from and into.
• Measures must be put in place to resolve problems 
that have arisen as a result of problematic interpreting, 
that is, for the removal of and replacement of the 
interpreter.
• A full recording of the interpreting should always be 
available just in case the quality of interpretation is 
questioned at a later stage.
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